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CONTENTS**Summary****I. Overview of Communist Supply Effort****Organization****Requirements****Volume****Distribution****Construction and Improvement of Roads in Laos and South Vietnam****II. Communist Supply to III Corps Area****Requirements****Impact of Material Losses****Direction of Flow****Transportation Corridors in III Corps****III. Supply Movements from Cambodia to Communist Forces in Laos****Foodstuffs****Other Non-military Supplies****Supply Routes for Foodstuffs and Other Non-Military Supplies****Arms and Ammunition****Border Crossing Points for Munitions****Origin of Arms Supplies from Cambodia****Seaborne Arms Movements****Overland Arms Movements from North Vietnam**

DIA review(s) completed.

Quantities of Munitions from Cambodia

Involvement of Cambodian Personnel

Appendixes

Appendix A. Statistical Tables

Tables

- 1. Communist Logistical Requirements in South Vietnam**
- 2. Communist Supply Losses in South Vietnam, January-September 1968**

Illustrations

- Figure 1. Communist Organizational Elements in Logistics Flow into South Vietnam and Communist and Allied Administrative Areas (map)**
- Figure 2. Selected Segments of North Vietnamese Logistics Network into Laos, Cambodia, and South Vietnam (map)**
- Figure 3. Viet Cong and North Vietnamese Commo-Liaison Corridors, Troop Movements, and Support Areas (map)**
- Figure 4. Communist Support Areas and Supply Flows from Cambodia into South Vietnam (map)**

Summary

The Ho Chi Minh Trail is the principal supply route for the external needs of the Communist forces in South Vietnam. This road and trail system has been progressively improved and expanded since early 1965. During the 1967-68 dry season improvements to the roads were made so that supplies could be moved by trucks into southern Laos throughout the rainy season (now drawing to a close), a capability lacking in previous years. Truck traffic to southern Laos is estimated to have averaged 180 tons per day during the period January through September in 1968, double that moved during a comparable period in 1967. The volume of supplies either moved to Communist forces in South Vietnam or stockpiled in southern Laos in the first nine months of 1968 averaged 115 tons a day, an amount 130 percent greater than the total for the comparable period in 1967.

An estimated 90 tons of military supplies and food per day - roughly 30 percent of total daily North Vietnamese Army (NVA) and Viet Cong (VC) requirements in South Vietnam -- are obtained from external sources. About 25 percent of the daily food, 30 percent of the Class II and IV (weapons, clothing, and equipment) and 85 percent of the ammunition requirements are obtained from external sources. About 43 percent (mainly ammunition, weapons, and equipment) of the volume of supplies required in South Vietnam from external sources move through Laos, 17 percent across the Demilitarized Zone, and 40 percent (mainly food) is received from Cambodia.

The 559th Transportation Group subordinate to the General Directorate of

Rear Services of the North Vietnamese Ministry of Defense is responsible for supply movements in southern Laos and its jurisdiction extends at least into I Corps. It also coordinates the flow of supplies with the B-3 Front in II Corps and with the Central Office for South Vietnam (COSVN) in III Corps and possibly IV Corps. In 1968 over 150 miles of roads have been constructed or improved by Communist forces principally in I Corps thus extending the Laotian truck routes deep into South Vietnam. But the north-south movement of supplies is dependent predominantly on porters moving short distances daily carrying loads or pushing load carrying bicycles over the infiltration trails in South Vietnam or Cambodia. Trucks are used when available on roads under Communist control, and rivers are exploited to float supplies for short distances.

Rice and other foods from Cambodia move directly into Communist base areas on Cambodian territory and thence directly across the border into the food deficit areas of South Vietnam. A small amount also transits the southern tip of Laos enroute. Munitions which have transited Laos move through northeastern Cambodia to base areas in South Vietnam. Communist forces in III and IV Corps are receiving considerable amounts of ammunition through southeastern Cambodian territory. These amounts come not only from the flow from the north but also from supplies infiltrated along the Cambodian coast or over-the-beach and thence the road and trail system. Small quantities may also be illicitly diverted from Cambodian military stocks.

I. An Overview of the Communist Supply Effort

Organization

1. The General Directorate of Rear Services of the North Vietnamese Ministry of Defense is responsible for procuring, storing, and distributing logistic support for the armed forces. The prime organizational element in the Communist logistical input into South Vietnam (RVN) is the 559th Transportation Group which operates under the direction of the General Directorate of Rear Services.* Created in 1959, it is responsible for the movement of men and supplies from North Vietnam to southern Laos and then to RVN via Laos and Cambodia. This responsibility also embraces reconstruction and repair of existing roads, construction of new roads, protection of the routes from both air and ground interdiction, receipt of new and maintenance of old vehicles and construction equipment, and administration of the personnel necessary to implement this mission.

2. [REDACTED] considerable data on the mission and performance of the 559th Transportation Group. Headquartered in the Tchepone area, it functions through 10 military stations and their subordinate battalions in southern Laos with an inventory of about 1,000 trucks. Its organizational control extends into South Vietnam via Route 9 (Khe Sanh), Route 922 (A Shau Valley), and Routes 165, and 96/110. [REDACTED]

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* See the map, Figure 1.

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Requirements for Logistic Support in South Vietnam

4. North Vietnam Army (NVA) and Viet Cong (VC) regular and administrative support forces in RVN require about 290 short tons* of supplies per day, of which an estimated 90 tons -- roughly 30 percent -- are obtained from external sources. About 25 percent of the total daily food, 30 percent of the Class II and IV (weapons and equipment), and 85 percent of the ammunitions requirements are supplied

* Short tons are used throughout this memorandum.

from external sources.*

Volume

5. Supplies delivered to southern Laos by the 559th Transportation Group in the first nine months of 1968 have averaged 180 tons per day, 115 tons** of which were available for stockpiling in Laos or forwarding for use in South Vietnam. These amounts are greater by 100 percent and 130 percent, respectively, than the totals for the comparable period in 1967. The dramatic increase in the volume in 1968 has been estimated on the basis of reports from roadwatch teams. Aerial observers who report a heightened level of truck activity on the main supply routes in the Laotian Panhandle during 1968 tend to support this estimate. Aerial observers, moreover, reflect an increased level of traffic on four routes (Routes 9, 922, 165, and 110) leading into RVN from Laos.*** The table below shows aerial sightings of trucks on the four routes in 1968 compared with 1967.

* See Table 1 in the Appendix.

** Derived by subtracting estimated average daily requirements for the Communists in southern Laos which amount to about 65 tons.

*** Although roadwatch teams do not confirm a comparable increase on routes leading to RVN, this failure may be a function of security difficulties in emplacing and maintaining the teams on the infiltration routes, and difficulties of the teams in observing traffic.

Trucks Reported by Pilots a/

<u>Route</u>	<u>1967</u>		<u>1968 (January to October)</u>	
	<u>Total</u>	<u>Average/day</u>	<u>Total</u>	<u>Average/day</u>
9	342	1	2108	8
922	432	1	904	3
165	29	negl.	155	1
110	858	2	767	3
Total	<u>1661</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>3954</u>	<u>14</u>

a/ Source: Defense Intelligence Agency. It must be noted that sharply increased attack sorties in 1968 probably played a role in the dramatically increased truck sightings in 1968 as compared with 1967.

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Distribution

7. An estimated 43 percent of the volume of supplies required in RVN from

external sources move through Laos, 17 percent across the Demilitarized Zone, and 40 percent are received from Cambodia (nearly one-third of which transits Laos). Although waterways and rudimentary mechanical and human modes of an inexhaustible variety are used to move supplies, motor trucks remain the key factor in this activity. The Ho Chi Minh Trail continues to be the principal supply route for the Class II, IV, and V external needs of the Communist forces in RVN. Routes 15 and 137 in North Vietnam and thence Routes 12 and 912 in Laos provide entry into the logistical land bridge in southern Laos and link with Route 911, the main north - south axis route in Laos. Shipments south through Laos on Route 911 are shunted east from the vicinity of Tchepone into RVN via Route 9 and parallel routes. Shipments moving south of Tchepone travel over Routes 92 or 914 to the junction of Route 92 and Route 922 which provides another entry point into RVN. South of the 92/922 junction, movement continues over Route 92 to Ban Bac. Here Route 96 south continues from Ban Bac to Chavane where Route 165 extends east to RVN. Route 96 then continues south from Chavane to join with Route 110, east of Attapeu, and provides the southernmost entry point into RVN from Laos via the road network.*

8. Units operating in I Corps are supplied by military stations of the 559th Transportation Group as well as directly across the DMZ by way of MR-IV Forward in North Vietnam. Communist units operating in II Corps are supplied by two administrative entities -- the B-3 Front in the western highlands and the Rear

* See the maps, Figures 2 and 3.

Services Group of MR-5 in the eastern regions of II Corps. These two entities are supplied by two main routes: (1) The route supporting MR-5 extends roughly from the northwestern tip of Kontum over to the area of western Quang Ngai and then down to the southern portion of Binh Dinh 1/ and (2) the route supporting B-3 Front runs south along the Cambodian/RVN border to Base Areas 702 and 701 west of Pleiku, and further south into Darlac at least as far as the area northeast of Ban Me Thuot.

9. Part of the route south of Base Area 701, has been defined by a PW in December 1967 as the Co. 10 Transportation Corridor with stations 18 kilometers (km) apart and capable of carrying rice and munitions. 2/ This route enters RVN at the Darlac-Pleiku border area. Another route, farther south, was implied in a captured document marked "urgent" which was to be passed to the B-3 Front Command. 3/ The document stated that most of the 18 B regiment would withdraw from the Nha Trang area of Khanh Hoa Province via the "... communication corridor of Da Nang Province (VC) located south of Ban Me Thuot City to Way Station 54 . . ." and from there to the entry-exit point of R (possibly COSVN). From this point the regiment was to proceed to Station 17 to receive weapons and other supplies as well as to undergo a reorganization. The entry point of the supply infiltration route described above was also known as Station 17.

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[REDACTED] Elements of the 1st NVA Division are currently located in Phuoc Long Pro-

vince and are dependent upon COSVN for logistical support. Previously, other NVA elements have been dependent upon supply caches in Cambodia west of Darlac Province. In December 1967, the 590th Transportation Battalion supplied the 33rd NVA regiment and 401st Local Force unit with food, ammunition, and small arms from caches in Cambodia. 5/ Similar instances have been reported in 1968. 6/

Construction and Improvement of Roads in Laos and South Vietnam

10. Since early 1965 the Communists have been constructing new roads and improving existing roads. By March 1967 the Communists had developed within the Laotian Panhandle a road network capable of moving at least 550 tons per day of supplies by truck all the way to the borders of RVN during the dry season. Beginning in the last quarter of 1967, at the end of the monsoon season, the Communist road construction and repair effort was noticeably intensified. As a consequence of the repairs, improvements, and extensions completed during the 1967-68 dry season the estimated wet-season capacity for continuous truck movement as far south as the A Shau Valley was increased from 50 to 100 short tons a day. An additional 50 tons of capacity has been made available for movements along routes leading into Quang Tin and Kontum Provinces. Throughout the rainy season which is now drawing to a close, construction workers have been active in maintaining the essential routes. For the first time the Communists have been

able to maintain a significant logistic flow into southern Laos during the wet season as shown below:

	<u>Short Tons Per Day</u>	
	<u>1967</u>	<u>1968</u>
May	90	120
June	20	135
July	5	110
August	5	75
September	120	95

11. During 1968 the Communist forces constructed or improved 150 miles of roads in RVN. This construction activity was centered primarily in I Corps and was concentrated on the improvement of Route 9 into Quang Tri Province. Other activity in I Corps was the improvement of Route 922 into Thua Thien Province. In the A Shau Valley, where Route 922 becomes Route 548 (South Vietnam), Route 547 was improved and extended toward Hue. Route 548 was extended south from the junction with Route 547 through Base Area 607 in Laos and into Quang Nam Province. Following construction of the extension of Route 165 east from Chavane, Laos, to Route 14 in South Vietnam, the Communists made improvements on Route 14 in Quang Tin Province northward toward Thuong Duc.

12. Significant construction activity was noted in the tri-border area of II Corps in 1968. Communist forces improved Laos Route 110 from Base Area 609 to a junction with Route 512 which connects with Route 14 at Dak To. Another road was extended south for 40 miles from the new extension of Route 110 in Base Area 609 through Kontum Province near the Cambodian border and ending in Pleiku

More can be said about roads in the
Long, ending with the road ^{VC} discovered further
35 miles of Saigon (Binh Duong, 1200)

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Province, about 25 miles west of the town of Fleiku.

13. Enemy road construction in III Corps, however, was not as extensive as it was in the two northern Corps, the area already having a well-developed network of roads and waterways. However, in April, 1968 a special forces team confirmed a new north-south Communist-built road and two large camps between RVN Routes 14 and 309, both of which parallel the South Vietnamese - Cambodian border. The road is about 20 miles long.

II. Communist Supply to the III Corps Area

The case for North Vietnamese external supply of Communist forces in I and II Corps of South Vietnam has been made above. That a portion of these supplies flow farther southward into III Corps is less known and deserves especial consideration and documentation.

Requirements

14. Communist forces in III Corps require a daily average of about 70 short tons of supplies, 18 tons of which are derived from external sources. Eleven tons of the external requirement is in food and seven tons in weapons, ammunition, clothing, and equipment. All of the external food requirement in III Corps is obtained from Cambodian sources and the bulk of Class II, IV, and V external requirements are met by imports over the Laotian infiltration corridor. The movement of seven short tons per day from Laos to areas in northern III Corps represents no hardship for the enemy. To move this amount from the southernmost road available to them in Laos to northern Phuoc Long Provinces in RVN -- a

distance of roughly 220 km -- the Communists would require about 2,500 people, most of whom would be local conscripts or soldiers used as porters.

Impact of Material Losses

15. Communist forces in III Corps have sustained heavy supply losses in the first nine months of 1968. III Corps was second only to I Corps in supply losses during this period.* From January through August 1968 eight tons of supplies per day were captured or destroyed by Allied ground forces in III Corps, about 47 percent of the external resupply requirement. Of the total losses, six tons were in food and two tons in munitions supplies. The Communists have the capability to make up most of this loss from internal sources but if they decided to replace the loss from external sources, daily resupply requirements would increase to about 78 tons of which external requirements would amount to 26 tons per day. Such losses in III Corps have contributed to a disruption of some planned military operations and have aggravated Communist resupply and internal distribution problems. The relatively low level of actions initiated recently by the Communists may be attributed in some measure to the destruction and capture of prepositioned supply caches in forward areas by Allied forces. We do not believe, however, that these losses would cause the Communists to seek supplies from Sihanoukville.

Direction of Flow

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* See Table 2 in the Appendix.

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[redacted] munitions movements to Communist units in III Corps are predominantly from north to south. The southerly movement may be augmented by munitions originating in Cambodia (as distinct from those transiting Cambodia) but the evidence for

this is not firm [redacted].

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Transportation Corridors in III Corps

17. Communist units operating in III Corps receive supplies from a crescent - shaped supply area extending from the Nam Lyr area in Cambodia west of Duc Lap around Tay Ninh Province (RVN) and down to the Parrot's Beak area of Svay Rieng Province in Cambodia. The enemy reportedly makes use of trucks throughout the area but rarely for any distance inside RVN. Trucks often have been reported at infiltration points along the Binh Long/Cambodia border and the Phuoc Long/Cambodian border. Trucks are also believed to be available in Base Area 740 (Nam Lyr), an area used many times for the infiltration of NVA units into III

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Corps.*

* See the map, Figure 3.

19. These RSGs (81 through 86) have long been responsible for the movement of material inside III Corps. One source gives their respective areas of responsibility as follows 2/:

<u>Rear Service Group</u>	<u>Area of Responsibility</u>
82	VC Sub-Region 1. Generally operating in the tri-border area of Binh Long, Tay Ninh, and Binh Duong Provinces.
83	VC Sub-Region 5 (Area North of CMD) in eastern Binh Duong Province.
81	VC War Zone D. Southern Phuoc Long, eastern Long Khanh Provinces.
84	Eastern Long Khanh Provinces.
85	Base Area 350, Northern Binh Long, Phuoc Long Province Border Area.
86	Northern Phuoc Long Province on Cambodian Border (Base Area 351).

20. The RSGs on the Cambodian border are generally supplied at way stations along the border by trucks from unknown areas. There are unconfirmed reports by returnees and PW's stating that some munitions came from Cambodian Army sources. The general movement in the rear services groups is south or east to caches or base areas in III Corps usually under the administration of sub-regions subordinate to COGVN.

21. The movements along the RVN/Cambodian border within the afore-mentioned crescent vary in direction according to the source consulted.* On the Tay Ninh/Cambodian border there have been many reports of movements south and east. The southerly movements begin in Cambodia opposite the northwestern corner of Tay Ninh Province and continue along the border to Svay

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* See the map, Figure 4.

Rieng Province in Cambodia and through Ba Thu village, Cambodia, to caches 15 miles west-southwest of Saigon. g/ There are also reports of material moving from area south of Tay Ninh City to the Parrot's Beak area. h/ In March of 1968 a heavily-armed VC battalion was located 10 miles east of Tay Ninh City moving in a westerly direction -- implying a source of supplies east of the city. Other reports indicate an easterly logistics flow from Cambodia north-northeast of Tay Ninh City. There are few reports of material infiltration on the northern border of Tay Ninh. The Cambodian/Binh Long and the Cambodian/Phuoc Long borders, however, are extensively used by enemy units for the infiltration of supplies including food and munitions.

22. RSG-86, in northern Phuoc Long Province, is perhaps the most active of the rear service groups operating in III Corps. It is known to support RSG-81 in southern Phuoc Long and eastern Long Khanh Provinces and probably RSG-84 in southeastern Long Khanh. 10/ The main resupply area for MR-6 reportedly is in the major area of operations of RSG-86. 11/ The movement of supplies from RSG-86 to MR-6 is substantiated by a document captured in northern Lam Dong Province between RSG-86 and MR-6 which indicated the existence of a corridor unit subordinate to MR-6 and staffed by Assault Youth. 12/

23. The function of RSG-85 currently is unclear. It was reported to have been deactivated in late 1967 and divided into two parts -- designated Group 50 and Group 70 -- but has appeared in documents dated 1968. However, there are subsequent reports of Groups 70 and 50 as well. The confusion may stem from

subordination. Groups 50 and 70 reportedly have operated on the Cambodian/RVN border area adjoining Tay Ninh and Binh Long Provinces, and also have received and transported tactical goods coming from North Vietnam through Cambodia to RVN. Group 50 delivered goods to RSG-83 and Group 70 delivered goods to RSG-81. 13/

24. Group 50 was reported to have moved rockets from an entry and exit point on the western Binh Long/Cambodian border as far south to RSG-83. RSG-83 has been reported to supply Sub-Region (SR-1). 14/ A captured VC document classified Absolute Secret spoke of a planned movement along that part of the Saigon River which is in Binh Duong Province and in VC SR-1. 15/ The movement was from the "major depot" of SR-1 and the total ordnance shipped was to be 700 short tons in a period of 40 to 50 days. At least some of the ordnance in this depot apparently moved southward from northern Binh Long.

25. Group 50 reportedly purchased "goods" at Mimot from Cambodians which were delivered to the western Binh Long/Cambodian border entry points. There is not indication that these "goods" were munitions and probably were not because the tactical goods moved by this group were originally from North Vietnam and would, therefore, not have to be purchased. All the reported movements of munitions into III Corps by Group 50 is in a southerly direction from northern Binh Long Province.

26. According to some reports, RSG-82 moves material along a southerly route parallel, if not identical, to the routes mentioned above as belonging to Group 50 and RSG-83 from the area near the meeting of the Tay Ninh/Binh Long/Cambodian

borders roughly to the Michelin Plantation area, about 30 miles northwest of Saigon. Other reports indicate that RSG-82 operates in other and possibly all areas of Tay Ninh Province. [redacted] for instance, states that SR-5 was supplied by RSGs 81 and 82. He gave the tri-border area of Hau Nghia, Binh Duong, and Tay Ninh Provinces as RSG-82's area of responsibility. This would involve a west to east movement. The Michelin Plantation area is also supplied by the 100-C Transportation Group operating in the Parrot's Beak area. 16/ How this group is supplied is unclear, but there has been movement into this area from south of Tay Ninh City and from the Cambodian side of the northwest area of Tay Ninh Province.

27. Other reported movements of munitions into III Corps show a southwesterly flow from the middle of the Phuoc Long/Cambodian border as far west as Tay Ninh and as far south as Binh Duong Provinces. Moreover, there was a report of the deactivation of the 52nd regiment of 320-A Division and the activation of Commo-liaison Transportation Group 90 in October of 1967. It was obtained by a

[redacted]

1967-1968. [redacted] stated that the group was "... responsible for the commo-liaison route from (Darlac to Binh Long) and the transportation service for R (COSVN)." 17/

APPENDIX A

STATISTICAL TABLES

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Table I
Communist Logistical Requirements
in South Vietnam

	Short Tons Per Day							
	I Corps		II Corps		III Corps		IV Corps	
	<u>Total</u>	<u>External</u>	<u>Total</u>	<u>External</u>	<u>Total</u>	<u>External</u>	<u>Total</u>	<u>External</u>
Class I (food)	88.54	25.00	60.58	24.00	55.92	11.00	27.96	negl.
Class II (clothing and equipment)	14.83	4.45	10.15	3.04	9.37	2.81	4.68	1.41
Class III (POL)	negl.	negl.	negl.	negl.	negl.	negl.	negl.	negl.
Class V (ammunition)	8.92	7.58	2.91	2.47	4.37	3.71	2.00	1.70
Total	112.29	37.03	73.64	29.51	69.66	17.52	34.64	3.11

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Table II

Communist Supply Losses in South Vietnam
(January - September 1968)

	Short Tons Per Day			
	<u>I Corps</u>	<u>II Corps</u>	<u>III Corps</u>	<u>IV Corps</u>
Class I (food)	6.41	1.57	6.57	.67
Class II and IV (clothing and equipment)	1.05	.23	.73	.33
Class III (FOL)	negl.	negl.	negl.	negl.
Class V (Ammunition)	2.39	.38	.93	.15
Total	9.85	2.18	8.23	1.15
Percent Distribution	46%	10%	38%	6%

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III. Supply Movements from Cambodia to Communist Forces in South Vietnam

Virtually all of the major Cambodian roads and waterways extending to the border of South Vietnam carry Cambodian goods to Vietnamese Communist forces. The shipments consist principally of foodstuffs, largely rice. Much smaller but unquantifiable amounts of munitions apparently move across the border in some areas -- predominantly in the south.

Foodstuffs

28.1. The consumption requirements of Vietnamese Communist Main, Local, and Administrative Support troops in South Vietnam for Cambodian foodstuffs in 1968 will total approximately 13,000 short tons. Requirements for stockpiling and the feeding of transients would be additional to these amounts. The bulk of the Communist requirement for Cambodian foodstuffs consists of rice for their forces in the 7 rice-deficit, border provinces, beginning with Tay Ninh in the south and including Kontum in the north central highlands. About 10,000 short tons of milled rice would be required from Cambodia to provide a daily ration of 1½ pounds per man to forces in these 7 provinces in 1968.

29.2. Actual deliveries of Cambodian foodstuffs to Communist forces probably will total considerably less than 13,000 tons, however, primarily because tribal dissidence and PAV military operations in northeastern Cambodia disrupted supplies to the B-3 Front area from mid-April to at least late September of 1968. (See paragraph for more information about these activities). *Gold insert from Fleming pg.* B-3 Front forces in Kontum, Pleiku, Darlac and Quang Duc are almost completely dependent on Cambodia for their rice requirement, estimated

24.2. Rampant tribal dissidence in Cambodia's northeastern provinces has seriously disrupted traffic on the Cambodian road and water routes that normally carry Cambodian goods to the Communist B-3 Front. Available evidence indicates that the disruptions have persisted for most of the time since mid-April, and may be prolonged (See paragraphs 32-33 for details). It is not clear to what extent the Vietnamese Communists have been able to channel Cambodian supplies to the B-3 Front over alternate routes, or whether food shortages reported in the B-3 area last summer were in any way connected with the disruptions to traffic through northeastern Cambodia. B-3 Front forces

to total 7-8,000 tons in 1968. [Because of the uprisings, actual deliveries to B-3 forces from Cambodia may cover only half their annual requirement. The disruptions probably contributed to rice shortages noted in the B-3 Front area after mid-year.] The larger numbers of Communist troops located further south in Phuoc Long, Binh Long and Tay Ninh Provinces are less dependent on Cambodian supplies. Documentary evidence indicates that the quantities of rice obtained by these forces from Cambodia amounted to 2-3,000 short tons in both 1966 and 1967, despite increases in troop strength in 1967. The total for 1968 probably will not be significantly higher.

30. The Vietnamese Communists also will obtain from Cambodia about 3,000 short tons of foodstuffs other than rice in 1968. These consist largely of dried fish, meat, salt, fish sauce, canned milk, and vegetables, most of which are consumed in Tay Ninh, Binh Long, and Phuoc Long Provinces.

Other Non-Military Supplies

31.4. The Vietnamese Communists obtain a wide range of other supplies in Cambodia. These include cloth, paper, office supplies, hoes, files, batteries, oxcarts, bicycles, radios, sandals, plastic sheeting, medicines, kerosene, flashlites, explosive chemicals and cigarettes. Many of these commodities are also available in South Vietnam, so that only small amounts are obtained from Cambodia as a matter of convenience.

Supply Routes for Foodstuffs and Other Non-Military Supplies

32.5. The northeastern Cambodian Provinces constitute a rice deficit area. At least 20,000 tons of rice a year are shipped from southern Cambodia to meet

local needs, and additional amounts are required to cover sales to Communist forces in South Vietnam. From Route 13 the principal routes for Communist supplies are by boat up the Tonle Kong and Tonle San (rivers) and by truck over Route 19 and its tributaries. These routes supply Base Areas 609, 702 and 701. Since March, rampant tribal dissidence has rendered all of these routes unsafe.

33. Aerial photography shows that obstructions of logs and trenches have made all road connections from Cambodia's Route 19 to the Communist base areas impassable to vehicles for at least the period

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Boat traffic up the Tonle Kong toward the Lao border is reported to have been restricted from mid-April to about mid-August. Cambodian authorities have prohibited foreign travellers from entering the area.

34. Since the uprising, the Vietnamese Communists have undertaken the improvement of their north to south supply route by extending a road across the Cambodian border 18 miles northwest of the US Special Forces camp at Duc Co on Route 19. The nearly 17 miles of new road within Cambodia runs through Base area 702 and terminates in a turn around loop on the west bank of the Tonle San 11 miles west of Duc Co. On the opposite bank of the Tonle San is a possible transshipment point which could readily be connected to Route 19 less than a mile away. Another segment under construction within South Vietnam connects with Laotian Route 110 and 96. When completed, the road will enable the enemy to truck supplies from North Vietnam via Laos to the Tonle San at Route 19. (See Figure). Cambodian army units, which

prior to the native rebellion had been adding to and strengthening their outposts in this area, apparently have not occupied any positions east of Andaueng Pech on Route 19 since mid-April of this year.

35g. Cambodian foodstuffs for Communist forces, Minh Long, Phuoc Long and southern Quang Nam Provinces of South Vietnam are trucked over Routes 7, 131, and 14 and offshoots leading from these routes to the border. The major part of these shipments, probably consists of rice from the mills in Snuol, Kratie, and Mimot and other nearby towns. In addition to the truck movements, considerable small scale smuggling is practiced in contiguous border areas by individuals using bicycles, or even portaging bags of rice to nearby Communist forces. [insert]

36g. Cross-border trade is brisk all along the densely populated border areas from Phuoc Long to the Gulf of Siam. Vietnamese Communist troops make extensive use of border markets to supplement their supplies. The heaviest cross-border trade in goods other than foodstuffs probably occurs along the border of Tay Ninh Province where COSVN staffs and numerous other forces normally are deployed.

Arms and Ammunition

37g. The transit of arms and ammunition destined for the Vietnamese Communists across Cambodian territory has been the subject of increasing numbers of reports

25X1 [redacted] Although such reporting may, in part, reflect an increased collection effort devoted to this topic, the intelligence coincides with evidence of sharply increased quantities of arms and

ammunition -- especially weapons and ammunition of higher caliber -- available to the Communist forces in South Vietnam. Moreover, the Allies have destroyed and captured significant quantities of ammunition in areas in III and IV Corps of South Vietnam which are near to reported Communist logistic routes in Cambodia.

Border Crossing Points for Munitions

38. The "Parrot's Beak" -- the Cambodian salient of Svay Rieng Province which projects in a southeasterly direction towards Saigon -- apparently is the area within Cambodia used most heavily by VC/NVA forces for movement of arms and ammunition to South Vietnam. Within the Parrot's Beak, the areas Ba Thu, Bavet and Chantrea appear to be the primary border crossing points for Communist military materiel with most of the supplies apparently destined for Communist troops in the southern part of III Corps. (See Figure).

39. 12. Other border crossing areas for the movement of arms and ammunition to Communist forces in South Vietnam, reading from south to north, are listed below: Areas along Cambodia's southern and central border with South Vietnam apparently are more important to the Vietnamese Communists for arms movements than areas along the northeastern border.

1. The southernmost border area of Cambodia and South Vietnam.
2. Communist Base Area 705 bordering on Chau Doc Province of South Vietnam.
3. Communist Base Area 704 in the area where the Mekong/Bassac Rivers cross the Cambodian - South Vietnamese border.
4. The Mimot - Snoul area bordering on Tay Ninh and Binh Long Province of South Vietnam.
5. Communist Base Area 351 bordering on Phuoc Long Province of South Vietnam.

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Add to paragraph 8: p 4

Cambodian Route 14 provides the shortest alternate route to the Tonle Kong, Se San and Route 19 complex for shipping Cambodian supplies to the B-3 Front, but there is no evidence that the use of Route 14 was increased to compensate for restrictions to traffic through Cambodia's northeast in 1968. The poor condition of the eastern extremity of Route 14 during the rainy season, and complaints of food shortages from B-3 forces around Duc Lap in the third quarter tend to discount the hypothesis that Route 14 was used as an alternate.

7. Communist Base Area 740 across from Quang Duc Province of South Vietnam.
8. Communist Base Area 701 and 702 near Pleiku Province of South Vietnam.
9. Communist Base Area 609 in the northeastern Cambodia salient in the tri-border area of Cambodia, Laos and South Vietnam.

Origin of Arms Supplies from Cambodia

40/12. It has not been possible to determine the points within Cambodia from which arms and ammunition are transferred to the Cambodian - South Vietnamese border. Communist prisoners and ralliers [redacted] who have provided information on Communist arms movements across the border have not had first-hand nor in most cases even second-hand knowledge of the course of the shipments. The balance of evidence appears to suggest, however, that munitions crossing the southeastern border of Cambodia to Communist forces in southern IV Corps had been infiltrated into Cambodia by sea. Armaments moved to the Communists in II Corps across the northeastern border apparently have been brought south through Laos. Materiel moved across the central border to the Communist forces in III Corps and parts of II and IV Corps probably includes arms and ammunition brought to Cambodia both via sea infiltration and via the Communist logistics system through Laos, South Vietnam and remote areas of northeastern Cambodia.

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Seaborne Arms Movements

41/12. The most likely place of entry into Cambodia of military materiel destined for the Communists is the poorly patrolled and thinly populated Cambodian coast.

Supplies smuggled in small boats over the coast could be moved to South Vietnam on Cambodian highways, waterways, and/or trails. The use of all such lines of communication have been reported.

15.
42. In 1968, the Cambodians have captured junks transporting arms and explosives apparently destined for the Viet Cong, and there are other credible reports of Communist-related smuggling activities along or over the coast. One report had arms and other supplies smuggled to the VC on motorized junks from the area of Khemarak Phouminville (near the Thai border) along the coast of Cambodia to South Vietnam.

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observed unusually fast junks

which apparently were engaged in some kind of smuggling along the coast east of Ream.

16.
43. provided the information that Cambodian naval vessels patrolling the Bay of Kompong Som in early 1968 seized over 20 tons of explosives destined for the VC. The explosives were being transported in junks manned by Vietnamese.

17.
44. Those few sources who have claimed to have been told where in Cambodia the arms shipments originated have named Sihanoukville or Phnom Penh, with Phnom Penh presumably being the storage or transfer point for deliveries from Sihanoukville. have reported that some Communist military aid shipments to Sihanoukville ostensibly destined for the Cambodian

armed forces, have in fact been earmarked for the Vietnamese Communists. (u f m 54)

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The presence of an NLF

official in Sihanoukville during the unloading, however, is not prima facie evidence that the cargoes were destined for the Communists in South Vietnam; and the cargoes may have been delivered to any one of a number of depots or military locations within Cambodia.

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All in all, there is still no

conclusive evidence that Communist military shipments to Sihanoukville have been diverted to the Vietnamese Communists.

41. On the other hand, continuing deliveries of military equipment to Cambodia raise the question whether these deliveries exceed Cambodian needs. The scanty information available on quantities and types of equipment included in Cambodia's military imports is not adequate to answer the question. Certainly Cambodia is

ill-equipped in comparison with her historically unfriendly neighbors --

Thailand and South Vietnam. Given the prevalence of corruption in Cambodia, however, it is possible that some military supplies, even if not present in excess, are siphoned off to the Communists from Cambodian military bases or depots.

Overland Arms Movements from North Vietnam

47. Finally, there is no doubt that some of the arms and ammunition moved across the border from Cambodia to South Vietnam have merely been stored on Cambodian territory after having been delivered from North Vietnam through Laos and/or South Vietnam. This certainly is true in northeastern Cambodia, where base areas 609, 701, and 702 appear to serve as adjuncts to or extensions of the Ho Chi Minh Trail, and probably is also true with respect to part of the arms traffic in the border-crossing areas farther south.

48. There are only a few credible reports of munitions shipments from southern Cambodia to the northeastern border areas, and even these reports cite very questionable data on the quantities moved. Moreover, the Ho Chi Minh Trail appears more than adequate to meet the needs of Communist forces in the areas of South Vietnam that are served by the border-crossing areas in northeastern Cambodia. Nevertheless, the possibility that military supplies occasionally are brought to these areas from southern Cambodia to supplement the flow from Laos cannot be discounted.

Quantities of Munitions from Cambodia

49. It is not possible to quantify the flow of arms and ammunition from Cambodia to Communist forces in South Vietnam. Most intelligence

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[redacted] makes no reference to the quantities

involved. Some sources report deliveries which appear to be far in excess of Communist needs. For example, one VC POW, who has supplied otherwise credible intelligence on a Communist supply route through the southernmost border region, claims that 2,200 tons of arms and ammunition were moved by this route into the IV Corps area of South Vietnam in 1967. This quantity, moved over only one route, is roughly equivalent to 40 percent more than the estimated average daily requirement of enemy troops in all of IV Corps for arms and ammunition in the third quarter of 1966 (4.2 tons) and perhaps 3-4 times the requirement in 1967 (roughly 1.5-2.0 tons).

50'
23. More credible data occasionally is provided, however. A POW captured in June, who claims to have worked for ~~VC Rear Services Group~~ ^{organization} responsible for moving supplies from the Parrot's Beak to South Vietnam, provided information suggesting that an average of 3 tons of ammunition were moved through Ba Thu each day between 1 April and 15 May 1968. He also said that he had heard that between November 1967 and March 1968 150 tons (about one ton per day) of "strategic goods" were moved to South Vietnam via another route in the Parrot's Beak. Communist external supply requirements for ammunition, equipment and clothing in III Corps, in the third quarter of 1968 are estimated to have been some 6.6 tons per day.

51'
24. The estimated current daily external requirement of Communist forces for ammunition, equipment and clothing in III and IV Corps totals only about 13 tons. Thus, it is clear that even if only a few routes from Cambodia

capable of moving perhaps 2-3 tons of materiel a day were available to carry supplies to Communist forces in South Vietnam, they could carry a substantial portion of the total requirement.

Involvement of Cambodian Personnel

52/25. Sihanouk has acknowledged an agreement with the National Liberation Front to provide unspecified amounts of rice and other non-military supplies to the VC. Deliveries of goods in accordance with this agreement apparently are effected to some extent by Cambodian military trucks and personnel, and these deliveries may stimulate some [] reports of voluminous arms movements. On the other hand, shipments of non-military goods could also serve to conceal munitions shipments, particularly if the cargoes were mixed.

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53/26. Inasmuch as smuggling and corruption are prevalent in Cambodia, it would be strange if some Cambodian officials were not involved in "gun running" to the Communists. Many reports on the movement of arms and ammunition to the Vietnamese Communists implicate Cambodian military and civilian personnel, including military officers and government and business officials. These reports often refer to the delivery in Cambodian commercial or military vehicles with Cambodian military personnel as drivers or escorts.

54/27. [] We have no convincing evidence, however, that officials at the highest levels of government are involved. On the contrary, Sihanouk has become increasingly insistent that his forces take all necessary steps to protect Cambodia's borders against foreign forces, whom he accuses -- apparently with some justification -- of supporting dissidence among native elements. In the

past six months, hostile clashes between Cambodian and Vietnamese Communist troops have occurred with unusual frequency. (If Chinese Communist ships, are, in fact, delivering arms to Sihanoukville for transfer to the Vietnamese Communists, however, high-level collusion would be necessary.]

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